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he recent turbulence in global stock markets has added to the problems facing 
monetary policy authorities worldwide. The analysis in this contribution suggests that 
the core of the problem is the bust of an over-investment cycle in China. The over-
investment had been propelled by a self-reinforcing cycle of higher investment and higher 
growth. But this cycle is now operating in reverse: lower investment leads to lower growth 
and to lower growth expectations. The credit expansion that accompanied and financed the 
over-investment will make the bust worse, but it does not in itself constitute the root cause of 
the problem. It will take some time to resolve the savings-investment imbalances in China 
because they involve both stock and flow problems. The stock of investment has overshot its 
medium-term equilibrium level and the flow supply of savings remains at extremely high 
levels. These imbalances have such a strong global impact because China now accounts for 
28% of global savings and investment (similar to the US and the euro area combined), and 
the looming imbalance within China is likely to be larger than has ever appeared in any 
other country experiencing excess savings. 
In short, the slowdown in China today is a reflection of an underlying ‘real’ domestic 
investment/savings imbalance that is so large that it will impact the global economy. But this 
imbalance is unlikely to be solved by monetary policy. The best that can be hoped for is that 
the central banks will manage to ‘paper over’ some of the unavoidable symptoms in credit 
markets. 
China: Long-term sustainable investment and the accelerator 
A defining characteristic of the Chinese economy is its combination of extremely high 
national savings and investment rates. The political leadership of the country has been trying 
for years to reassure the world that it is aware of these internal ‘imbalances’ and is 
committed to redirecting the growth model away from investment (and exports) and 
towards consumption. But so far, the switch away from investment has been very slow. The 
investment rate in 2014 was close to 48% of GDP only 1 percentage point lower than in 2009. 
Over-investment cycles are so dangerous and difficult to identify because they create a self-
reinforcing mechanism (also called an ‘accelerator’): investment is part of aggregate demand 
and hence GDP. Higher investment thus increases measured GDP growth, which implies 
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that a higher investment rate seems justified when higher growth rates materialise. 
Moreover, higher investment also increases future potential output growth. This feedback 
mechanism makes it very difficult to estimate the long-run sustainable rate of investment of 
a country, especially one engaged in rapid development.  
But what it is certain, as suggested by both theory and historical experience, is that higher 
investment rates cannot lead to permanently higher growth rates, just a higher output level. 
The ‘acceleration’ of growth from higher investment cannot be permanent because once the 
investment rate reaches a certain level, returns will start to fall and growth will return to its 
underlying rate.  
An over-investment cycle then arises if the temporary nature of the growth boost from a 
shock to investment is not recognised. This seems to have been the case in China after 2008.   
The boost to investment driven by government policies in response to the global slump in 
demand was extraordinary under any measure. The investment rate rose from about 41% (in 
2007) to 48% of GDP (in 2010); i.e. in about three years. This yielded an increase in measured 
GDP of several percentage points (as intended, since the investment programme was 
supposed to provide a stimulus to domestic demand). The problem is that the temporary 
nature of this investment boom was not taken into account, and growth rates at 10% were 
taken as a sign that China could maintain double-digit growth rates even when global 
growth had fallen in the wake of the great financial crisis. This miscalculation led to the 
conclusion that a permanently higher investment rate was appropriate for China. 
In other words, it was a misperception about the underlying growth rate that seemed to 
make the combination of permanently higher investment and growth rates sustainable. As 
long as the capital-to-output ratio does not increase too much, the rate of return on 
investment does not deteriorate, confirming this perception. But this cannot go on for long.  
When the marginal productivity of investment eventually starts to fall, as it has now in 
China, the boom turns into a bust. At that point, the same ‘accelerator’ mechanism starts to 
work on the way down: once the capital stock has been recognised as being too high, a 
slowdown in investment leads to lower growth, which in turn would seem to make a lower 
investment rate appropriate.  
This might be happening at present in China where the stimulus spending has run its course 
and the attempt to prop up private spending via a stock market boom has failed 
spectacularly. The observed growth rates in China from 2008 to 2014 might have been well 
above the longer-term sustainable rate, and the markets are reacting so strongly because they 
fear that Chinese growth might now undershoot the equilibrium rate for a time until the 
excess capital spending of the last five years has been absorbed. 
What are the implications for the rest of the world? 
To answer this question, one needs to know what happens to savings and hence to the 
savings/investment balance in China, i.e. how the current account will develop. If China’s 
national savings rate were to remain at around 45-50% of GDP, a re-emergence of very large 
current-account surpluses seems unavoidable once the accelerator shifts into reverse gear.  
An order of magnitude of the impact of an over-investment cycle in China on the world 
economy can be easily established. Assuming a longer-run growth rate of 6%, the investment 
rate that would prevent the capital-to-output ratio from increasing would be about 35% of 
GDP (see the table in the Appendix for calculations). This is 12 percentage point lower than 
the present investment rate. Since savings are unlikely to fall quickly by a similar amount, a 
large current-account surplus would be the consequence in the medium run. This would of 
course also require a substantial devaluation of the renmimbi. 
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Moreover, while an investment rate of 35% of GDP would be sustainable in the long run 
with a long-run growth rate of 6%, it is likely that, because of the accelerator effect, growth 
would initially be potentially much lower, given that the fall in investment would also 
depress growth. The short-run impact on growth of scaling back investment might thus be 
larger. 
This potential desire of China to run larger current-account surpluses clashes with the 
nascent recovery within the euro area. The adjustment in peripheral countries has so far been 
based mainly on compression of imports, and it was hoped that the expansion would now be 
underpinned by higher exports. 
The assertion that China has been experiencing an unsustainable investment boom seems 
difficult to accept for a nation whose capital-to-labour ratio is still much lower than that of 
advanced countries. The capital stock per worker, for example, is still much lower (by a 
factor of five) in China than in the United States.  
But what matters for investors and savers is not the capital-to-labour ratio, but the 
productivity of the capital, which can be seen from the capital-to-output ratio. Advanced 
economies typically have a capital-to-output ratio of between 2 and 2.5 (somewhat higher for 
the euro area with its stronger manufacturing sector). China has already exceeded this value. 
This year its capital/output ratio is above 3, as shown in Figure 1, below. And under current 
trends (as forecast by the IMF), the Chinese capital/output ratio would, in a few years, 
exceed even that of Japan. The current upheaval in financial markets is most likely due to the 
fact that these trends could not continue. 
Figure 1. Capital-to-output ratios in major economies 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on IMF WEO data. 
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The looming end of over-investment in China is likely to constitute a major drag for the 
global economy for the medium-term future and could force central banks everywhere to 
keep their foot on the accelerator. The People’s Bank of China is likely to join central banks 
elsewhere around the world with measures to stabilise the economy. But this is unlikely to 
be effective since the current downturn in China was not caused by a monetary squeeze, but 
rather by falling returns to capital as the result of a protracted investment boom. 
 
 
 
 
 
Tabular Appendix 
Table A1. Steady-state capital-to-output ratios for different growth rates and investment ratios (I/Y) 
             I/Y 
 
growth    
0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 
0.1   1.9 2.2 2.5 2.8 
0.08  1.8 2.1 2.5 2.9 3.2 
0.06 1.7 2.1 2.5 2.9 3.3 3.8 
0.04 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0  
0.02 2.5 3.1 3.8 4.4   
Source: Author’s own calculations. For details see www.ceps.eu/publications/global-economy-2030-
trends-and-strategies-europe-0 
